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REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS IN SOCIOCULTURAL
CONTEXT
Nancy S. Kim*
If... [contract (though I surely hope not quite "as we have
known it") is to continue with us, powerful and vast, into an
indefinite future, then we are faced with a body of doctrine
about day to day transactions which originated in Elizabeth's
time, which was built out heavily in a 19th Century that had
only begun to foreshadow modern conditions, and which has
never at any stage been critically restudied as a whole in terms
of wherein it serves well, wherein it is out of joint. Surely such
a body of doctrine vitally needs such critical restudy. The
United States has work to do; and legal machine tools also
have a function.'
-K.N. Llewellyn
INTRODUCTION
Llewellyn wrote those words over half a century ago, and in this
era of email, text messages, and cell phones, they may be even more
true. A globalized marketplace and technological advancements
have resulted in greater diversity between and among contracting
parties inside and outside the United States. The parties to a
contract do not always share the same set of cultural references,
vocabulary, or business practices.2 Technology brings together
* Visiting Professor, Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law, and
Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. A version of this Article
was presented at the Contracts in Context: Identity, Power, and Contractual
Justice Symposium at Wake Forest University School of Law, Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, March 26-27, 2010. I offer sincere thanks to Dean Blake
Morant and Professor Larry DiMatteo for organizing this symposium and for
inspiring the contextual contracts movement. I greatly appreciate the diligent
efforts of the symposium editors of the Wake Forest Law Review and the
helpful comments of the attendants and participants at the symposium. I also
thank Natalie Watson for her excellent research assistance.
1. K.N. Llewellyn, On the Complexity of Consideration: A Foreword, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 777, 782 (1941).
2. Elsewhere I have discussed the need for a more dynamic approach to
contract interpretation for these reasons. See Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business
and Social Norms and Interpretation Rules: The Need for a Dynamic Approach
to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REV. 506, 531-39 (2005).
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parties of different experiential reference points by greatly
facilitating transactions across vast geographical distances. It also
increases the likelihood of substantive misunderstandings by
creating novel contracting situations that often reveal implicit or
unexpressed assumptions held by the parties.
The goal of contract law is often said to be the enforcement and
protection of the reasonable expectations of the parties. Unlike the
purpose of criminal law or tort law, the underlying purpose of
contract law is not enforcement of societal standards or norms (other
than the norm that if you make a contract, you should keep it). A
contract is not enforced solely or even primarily because the
substance of what the parties have agreed to is normatively
desirable,4 nor does contract law force parties into contracts to
which they have not agreed, even if those contracts would be socially
beneficial. A contract is enforced because the parties have agreed to
it.5 They have consented.6  One of the main objectives of contract
law, then, is furthering personal autonomy-the "freedom to
contract."' An extension of this idea is that our judicial system may
force the breaching party to keep his or her promise-or pay
damages for failing to do so-because the other party wants him or
her to keep the promise, not because the particular thing the party
promised to do is normatively desirable.!
There is also a societal benefit and objective in enforcing
contracts. In a credit economy, parties must be able to depend upon
3. See, e.g., ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: ONE VOLUME
EDITION § 1, at 2 (1952).
4. For a discussion of the various views regarding the origins of the
binding nature of contracts, see LARRY A. DIMATTEO, CONTRACT THEORY 7-11
(1998). DiMatteo notes:
The entire task of the law of contracts has been to find the appropriate
dividing line between the morally binding and the legally binding
promise. The bindingness of promise varies among the perspectives of
morality, religion, and culture. (The essence of contract law is the
determination of which of life's many promises are not to be
recognized as legally enforceable.)
Id. at 8.
5. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 57 (1981) (noting that "the parties are bound to their contract
because they have chosen to be").
6. See generally; Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as
Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022 (1992) [hereinafter Barnett, Some Problems]
(arguing in favor of a consent theory as opposed to a promise theory of contract);
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 269 (1986)
[hereinafter Barnett, A Consent Theory] (discussing consent as an essential
moral component of contracts).
7. See Barnett, Some Problems, supra note 6, at 1023-24.
8. See Jules L. Coleman, Some Reflections on Richard Brooks's "Efficient
Performance Hypothesis," 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 416 (2007),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/scholarship
/some-reflections-on-richard-brooks%e2%80%99s-%e2%80%9cefficient
-performance-hypothesis%e2%80%9d/.
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the promises made by others.! A buyer, for example, who is able to
purchase equipment on credit with thirty-day payment terms can
generate revenue during that thirty-day period. Credit benefits
both the buyer and the seller by greasing the wheels of commerce.
A determination of the reasonable expectations of the parties
should capture the intent of the parties in entering into a contract
and balance the parties' intent with any countervailing societal
considerations. Intent, however, is a multifaceted concept.
Elsewhere, I proposed that there are three facets to the concept of
contractual intent. 0 Volitional intent captures a party's willingness
to enter into an agreement." A party entering into an agreement
under duress, for example, lacks volitional intent. Cognitive intent
refers to a party's understanding of the proposed contract. 2 A party
entering into an agreement that contains terms that he or she does
not understand lacks cognitive intent. Contextual purposive intent
captures a party's motive for entering into a contract, including the
relevant circumstances under which a contract is made.' 3 For
example, a party who rents out a house on a certain street in order
to view a parade has the contextual purposive intent of viewing the
parade.1
Under the objective theory of contract, courts interpret the
intent of the parties in adopting a particular contractual term
according to the reasonable meaning of that term, or the meaning
that a reasonable person would assign to that term." Courts adopt
the objective theory to determine all aspects of the understanding
between the parties-from the determination of contract formation,
to an evaluation of the meaning of written or spoken terms, to an
assessment of contract performance' 6  In a series of articles,
9. See Robert A. Prentice, "Law &" Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REv. 881, 933 (2007).
10. See generally Nancy Kim, Mistakes, Changed Circumstances and Intent,
56 U. KAN. L. REV. 473 (2008) (proposing an expanded intent analysis in basic
assumption defenses).
11. Id. at 480.
12. Id. at 480-81.
13. Id. at 481.
14. See Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740, 746-50 (Eng.).
15. See CORBIN, supra note 3, § 106, at 156.
16. Professor Melvin Eisenberg describes the rationale for the classical
contract approach:
Psychologically, the assumption underlying the embrace of the
classical model seems to have been that everyone knows, or can fairly
be taken to know, the law. For some, the model may also have
reflected a behavioristic theory that assumes either that subjective
states of mind are nonexistent or that because they are unobservable
they are unknowable, so that we must accept conventional objective
signs as tokens of the interior states to which the signs normally
correspond.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1107, 1109 (1984).
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Professor Melvin Eisenberg explained how modern contract law
evolved from the will theory to the classical model, and from the
classical model to a more responsive and dynamic model.17  This
Article argues in favor of such a progression. An objective theory of
contract erroneously replaces the parties' intent with a
reasonableness standard. Reasonableness should be the product of
weighing subjective intent against societal considerations, not a
factor used to make such a determination."' When one of the parties
lacks the requisite subjective intent, a court may nevertheless
enforce a contract when a failure to do so would cast doubt on the
security of transactions and thus endanger our credit economy.
A dynamic approach better serves a dynamic society. In the
modern global and technologically driven marketplace, the objective
theory of contract incompletely captures-in fact, in some cases,
even undermines-contract law's objective of promoting individual
autonomy. This Article further argues that in order for modern
contract law to be truly "dynamic," it must take into consideration
the social and cultural backgrounds and social identities of the
parties.20 This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the
role that social identity and experience play in contract law and
introduces the tension between sociocultural dissonance and an
17. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law,
88 CAL. L. REV. 1743 (2000) (examining the shift from static to dynamic rules of
contract); Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 1111 (reconceptualizing contract law
based upon "considerations of fairness," and "a functional analysis of the
relevant issue in terms of fairness and policy"); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640 (1982) (proposing a
reconstruction of the doctrine of consideration along modern lines); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REV. 741 (1982)
(arguing that limits on the bargain principle are justified in certain cases).
Larry DiMatteo makes a similar observation when he notes that "[alctual
thought was replaced by manifested thought." DIMATrEo, supra note 4, at 12.
18. See Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147-48 (Ind. 1971) ("The
law should seek the truth or the subjective understanding of the parties in this
more enlightened age.... Only in this way can justice be served and the true
meaning of freedom of contract preserved.").
19. As Lon Fuller observes:
The principle of private autonomy, properly understood, is in no
way inconsistent with an "objective" interpretation of contracts.
Indeed, we may go farther and say that the so-called objective theory
of interpretation in its more extreme applications becomes
understandable only in terms of the principle of private autonomy. It
has been suggested that in some cases the courts might properly give
an interpretation to a written contract inconsistent with the actual
understanding of either party. What justification can there be for
such a view? We answer, it rests upon the need for promoting the
security of transactions.
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 808 (1941).
20. Larry DiMatteo has stated, "Each person's past experiences prior to
entering the particular contractual relationship help mold their personal
understanding of the contract." DIMATTEo, supra note 4, at 54.
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objective approach. Part II analyzes the difference that culture
makes by examining a recent case involving two Korean-born
businessmen. Part III analyzes the difference that gender makes by
examining a case involving divorce and in vitro fertilization. This
Article concludes that courts should consider contextual factors,
including the background and identity of the parties, in order to
better achieve the goal of contract law-to protect the reasonable
expectations of the parties.
I. SOCIOCULTURAL IDENTITY, LEGAL FORMALITIES, AND CONTRACT
LAW
A. Reasonableness as Credibility (and Vice Versa)
Courts enforce properly formed and otherwise valid contracts,
provided that one of the parties seeks enforcement; on the other
hand, courts will not enforce contracts that neither party wants to
perform, even if the contractual performances would be socially
beneficial.2 1 Furthermore, parties can freely rescind or modify their
agreements provided that both do so voluntarily.22 While the
general rule is that modifications require consideration, this is
somewhat imprecise. It is not criminal to modify a contract without
consideration. If both parties want to modify their contract and seek
the same modification, the courts will not stop them.23 Contract law
technically requires consideration, but the requirement of
consideration is intended primarily to evidence that both parties in
fact wanted to modify the contract-that is, that there was no
deception or coercion.24 Courts intervene in private matters only
when one of the parties denies the modification or changes his or her
mind about it.
In the context of a contract dispute then, the nonbreaching
party asks the court to enforce the terms of the contract that the
parties allegedly had agreed to at a particular moment in time. The
intent of the parties that is relevant to the courts is their intent at
the time of contract formation." If the parties never wanted the
21. Lon Fuller notes:
Among the basic conceptions of contract law the most pervasive and
indispensable is the principle of private autonomy. This principle
simply means that the law views private individuals as possessing a
power to effect, within certain limits, changes in their legal
relations.... When a court enforces a promise it is merely arming
with legal sanction a rule or lex previously established by the party
himself.
Fuller, supra note 19, at 806.
22. ROGER E. MEINERS ET AL., THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BusiNEss 317
(5th ed. 1994).
23. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
4.1, at 167 (4th ed. 1998).
24. See id. § 5.15, at 241.
25. DIMATTEO, supra note 4, at 56.
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same thing, then the contract lacked mutual assent."
Yet, the application of the doctrine of mutual assent does not
fully capture what may happen when two parties enter into a
contract. In some cases, one party does not agree with the other
party's version of events and thus there was no mutual "in-sync"
moment. This would be the case if, for example, one of the parties
was joking. 7  Nevertheless, the courts may enforce the contract
under the objective theory.2 8 Or, there may have been a mutual "in-
sync" moment but at a later time, one of the parties wants to escape
performance and raises a legal basis, such as mutual mistake, for
avoiding or rescinding the contract.2 9 In both types of situations, the
judge or jury decides whether the contract is enforceable.3o How and
what they decide usually depends on a determination of
reasonableness.
The determination of reasonableness depends on the version of
events that is most credible to the decision maker, be it judge or
juror.2 ' An example of this is the reasonableness standard in
interpretation. In determining reasonableness, the decision maker
likely uses himself or herself as a reference point, in effect asking,
"Is this how I would have acted?"32  If one party was acting
unreasonably (i.e., differently from how the decision maker would
have acted in the same situation), the decision maker is less likely to
believe that party. If the offeree was acting unreasonably and the
offeror was acting reasonably, the decision maker is more likely to
believe the offeror." If both parties are acting unreasonably, the
decision maker will likely believe neither party and will probably
conclude that there was no mutual assent.34  If both parties are
acting reasonably, the decision maker probably will not be able to
decide who to believe and will likely find no mutual assent.3 "
Reasonableness and credibility play important roles even when
the contractual dispute does not involve contract interpretation or
formation (rife though the formation question may be with possible
interpretation issues in determining mutual assent and terms of an
26. Id. at 11.
27. See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954) (enforcing a
contract to sell a farm that the seller intended to offer for sale only as a joke).
28. See id.
29. See Kim, supra note 2, at 512.
30. See, e.g., Lenawee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203,
208 (Mich. 1982).
31. See DIMATTEO, supra note 4, at 133 (noting courts' reference to
community values when applying legal standards such as the reasonable
person).
32. Id. at 135.
33. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981) (explaining
contract interpretation rules when the parties disagree about the meaning of
terms).
34. Cf id. §§ 20, 201.
35. Cf id.
IVol. 45646
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offer). When one of the parties raises a contract defense, such as
mistake or nondisclosure, the success of such an argument often
hinges, even if not expressly, on the decision maker's determinations
of reasonableness and credibility. For example, in determining
whether a vendor has an affirmative duty to disclose material facts
when one party labors under a mistaken basic assumption, the court
considers factors including whether a failure to disclose would
amount to "a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing."37
Reasonableness in contract law conflates two different
concepts-believability/credibility and social conformity/normality."
Contract law's use of reasonableness as a standard seeks both to
enhance the accuracy or truthfulness of the parties' claims and to
situate a claim as one that is or is not normatively desirable.3 9 But
a problem arises when the determination of truthfulness or accuracy
depends on the normative desirability of the claim or action.
In a situation in which one party has misconstrued the meaning
of a contract, societal considerations should determine the outcome
of the dispute because the divergent understandings or the "intent"
and "expectations" of each party should be given equal weight.40
The reasonableness standard works appropriately here to uphold
contract law's objectives. In another type of situation, however, the
parties may share the same understanding of the contract but one of
the parties may later wish to invalidate the contract.4 ' The problem
in the latter situation is not that the parties misunderstood each
other or the terms of the contract; it is that one party is using a legal
formality, such as the requirement of consideration or the statute of
frauds, to escape a promise that he or she intended to make.
Contract formalities may serve useful purposes, but too often those
purposes are not in the service of determining or effectuating
contractual intent, as I further explain in the next Subpart.
B. Intent and Contract Formalities
In a classic article, Professor Lon Fuller identifies three
purposes underlying legal formalities: evidentiary, cautionary, and
channelingi4 The requirement of consideration is "intended to
36. See Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (examining
certain instances of nondisclosure in terms of reasonableness).
37. Id.; accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981).
38. See DIMATTEO, supra note 4, at 80, 137.
39. Id.
40. See Kim, supra note 10, at 486-88 (calling for a dynamic approach to
contractual intent and enforcement to promote "society's interest in the security
of transactions").
41. See id. at 509-10.
42. Of. Fuller, supra note 19, at 799 (giving the rationale for contract
formalities and for allowing parties to renege when formalities are lacking).
43. Id. at 800-01.
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remove the hazards of mistaken or perjured testimony which would
attend the enforcement of promises for which nothing is given in
exchange."4 Similarly, as the name indicates, the purpose of the
statute of frauds is to guard against false or fraudulent claims.4 5
The cautionary function also addresses presumed weaknesses in the
manner in which a promise is made.46 The requirement of
consideration invalidates gratuitous promises that are assumed to
be made impulsively and rashly. Written agreements are assumed
to require more forethought and deliberation than oral
48
agreements.
While the evidentiary and cautionary functions of legal
formalities are self-explanatory, the channeling function is more
obscure. Fuller refers to the "channeling function of form" as a way
to mark off or signal the enforceability of a promise.4 9 Form, then,
can provide a "legal framework into which the party may fit his
actions."50 The evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions of
the law are interrelated in that a form that accomplishes one of
these purposes usually accomplishes one or both of the others."
Legal formalities promote contract law's objective of ensuring
autonomous decision making by providing certain formal safeguards
to ensure that an agreement was in fact entered into, and that it
was entered into deliberately. 52 Personal or private autonomy has
been understood to mean that the "will of the parties sets their legal
relations."" Consequently, enforcement of a contract accomplishes
that objective only if the contract was actually an exercise of that
party's autonomy and not the result of coercion or duress.
Both the doctrine of consideration and the statute of frauds aim
to protect and promote the multifaceted intent of the parties. The
evidentiary and channeling functions address the parties' volitional
intent.5 5 A bargained-for exchange and a written agreement both
evidence that the parties had the volitional intent to enter into the
44. Id. at 799.
45. See id. at 800-04.
46. Id. at 799-800.
47. Id. at 799. Fuller notes, however, that:
[T]he enforcement of gratuitous promises is not an object of sufficient
importance to our social and economic order to justify the expenditure
of the time and energy necessary to accomplish it. Here the objection
is one of "substance" since it touches the significance of the promise
made and not merely the circumstances surrounding the making of it.
Id. at 799-800.
48. Id. at 800.
49. Id. at 801.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 803.
52. Id. at 806-07.
53. Id. at 807.
54. See Kim, supra note 10, at 480.
55. See id.
648 [Vol. 45
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contract. Both the requirement of a writing and the requirement
of a bargain serve a cautionary function which aligns with cognitive
and contextual purposive intent.57 The promise to make a gift, for
example, is often done impulsively, emotionally, and with limited
knowledge of relevant factors, which is presumably one of the
reasons that such promises are not enforceable." Promises to make
gifts do not stimulate and perpetuate a credit economy in the way
that bargain promises do (unless such promises are relied on, in
which case courts may enforce them under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel).' 9
Inherent in the doctrine of consideration are societal norms and
standards of what constitutes reasonable behavior in certain
situations. A reasonable person, for example, would document a
real estate transaction in writing because such transactions are
typically for substantial financial amounts and involve conveyances
that must or should be recorded.o Similarly, the requirement of
consideration effectively treats promises to make outright gifts as
unreasonable or at least unworthy of state enforcement. 6' The
contextual purposive intent for a promise to make a gift is assumed
to be something other than the simple desire to give the gift. 62 A
ulterior motive for making the promise is assumed, such as a desire
to assuage guilt or curry favor, and such emotions and desires are
viewed as too transient to be worthy of judicial enforcement. A
completed gift, however, rebuts this presumption of transitory
desires and the courts will not step in to reverse acts (as opposed to
promises) of generosity absent extenuating circumstances.' A
completed gift also has a greater impact on the economy as the
recipient of the gift may have exercised acts of ownership or used
the gift in a way that generates further commercial exchanges, such
as selling or renting the gifted item.6 ' By contrast, a promise to
make a gift sets off no chain of commercial activity, unless the
promisee relies upon the promise. In theory then, both the statute
of frauds and the doctrine of consideration reflect the two primary
contract law objectives of furthering the multifaceted intent of the
parties and promoting commerce in a credit economy by ensuring
the security of transactions.
In his treatise on contracts, Arthur Corbin questions whether a
56. Id.
57. Id. at 480-83.
58. See Fuller, supra note 19, at 799.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
60. See id. § 125.
61. Fuller, supra note 19, at 799.
62. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 115, at 172.
63. Id. § 114, at 170, § 115, at 172.
64. Id. § 114, at 170-71.
65. See Prentice, supra note 9, at 933.
2010] 649
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definition of consideration is practicable:
[T]here never was any specific and definite "origin" to be
discovered, that no particular definition can (or ever could) be
described as the only "correct" one, and that there has never
been a simple and uniform "doctrine" by which enforceability
can be deductively determined. Nevertheless, the use of the
term can not [sic] be avoided; but, in making use of it, it is
necessary to consider the purpose for which it is used and to
make sure that justice is not being defeated by using it in
accordance with some narrow and limited definition.66
In Consideration and Form, Fuller also notes the problems with
the doctrine of consideration, but states:
What needs abolition is not the doctrine of consideration but a
conception of legal method which assumes that the doctrine
can be understood and applied without reference to the ends it
serves. When we have come again to define consideration in
terms of its underlying policies, the problem of adapting it to
new conditions will largely solve itself. 61
The observations of these two giants of contract law are especially
relevant where sociocultural dissonance exists, either between the
parties or between the parties and the decision maker.
C. The Role of the Judge in Contract Disputes
Whether born from experience or inherent physiological or
cultural differences ... our gender and national origins may
and will make a difference in our judging.... I would hope
that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a
white male who hasn't lived that life. 8
During her confirmation hearings, Supreme Court Justice Sonia
Sotomayor was questioned by several senators about what the
media referred to as the "wise Latina woman" comment.69 While it
is unsurprising, given the political nature of the hearings, that she
qualified and recast the meaning of her remarks,"o the portion of her
66. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 109, at 161.
67. Fuller, supra note 19, at 824.
68. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002)
(emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Neil A. Lewis, Republicans Press Judge About
Bias and Activism, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 2009, at Al (noting that "Republican
senators sparred with Judge Sonia Sotomayor" about her speeches, including
the "wise Latina" line that "has drawn the most attention").
70. In response to questioning about her "wise Latina woman" comment,
Sotomayor dismissed it as a "rhetorical flourish that fell flat" and that left the
wrong impression. Id.
650 [Vol. 45
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speech cited above captures a viewpoint that is both controversial
and obvious. This perspective is controversial because the role of
the judiciary is typically viewed as a dispassionate one,7' and yet is
obvious because the judges that comprise the judiciary are flesh and
blood human beings. Factual interpretation-and justice-in any
given case may be a matter of perspective. Two recent studies
support this view.
The first study researched the relationship between the race of
a judge and the outcomes in cases alleging racial harassment in the
workplace.72 It found that on average "plaintiffs before African
American judges are 3.3 times more likely to win than before White
judges." The second study found that "gender and judicial ideology
(as measured by party of the appointing President) significantly
affected the results" of sexual harassment and sex discrimination
cases,74 and that "both liberal and conservative female judges were
more likely than their male counterparts to support plaintiffs" in
sexual harassment cases.7 ' An awareness of the influence that
judges' experiences may have on their decision making underscores
the need to recognize sociocultural dissonance in certain cases.
When a judge lacks experience or familiarity, he or she may
disregard certain facts or neglect to appreciate their importance.76
Sotomayor made this observation when she stated, "Personal
experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see."7
Yet, observing that one's experiences shape one's viewpoints
and opinions is not the same thing as suggesting that one is unable
to transcend those experiences in order to apply law to facts without
prejudice, nor does it mean that all members of one sociocultural or
socioeconomic group will view things in the same way. The facts
and rules applicable to a particular case determine the acceptable
range of judicial discretion. There are many areas in which the law
71. The idea that the law is neutral and can be applied in an objective
manner has been disputed by critical legal studies scholars. See generally
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) (examining tensions
between mechanical rule application and ad hoc analysis); Robert W. Gordon,
Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195
(1987) (critiquing the rigid mindset of modem legal practice).
72. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117
(2009).
73. Id. at 1156.
74. Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1769
(2005).
75. Id. at 1777.
76. See id. at 1781-84 (noting that male judges might reach different
results if they are persuaded by or defer to their female colleagues who are
perceived to be more knowledgeable about the subject in controversy).
77. Sotomayor, supra note 68, at 92.
78. For example, the judge who decided In re the Marriage of Witten, 672
N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) was a woman. See infra Part III.A-B.
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expressly invites consideration of subjective experiences, at least to
a certain extent. One of these areas is contractual intent and
interpretation."o As Dean Blake Morant has stated, "[I]n many
controversies involving principles of contract, factors of race,
ethnicity, or gender can play a tangential, if not pivotal, role in the
formation and adjudication of many binding obligations.""' Power in
contracts, then, can mean more than socioeconomic leverage; it
includes the power of shared assumptions, understandings, and
world views with those who adjudicate contract disputes.
In the same "wise Latina woman" speech that received so much
attention, then-Judge Sotomayor made another observation that
received much less attention, but that is especially relevant in
understanding why context is so important to contractual intent:
[Wie should not be so myopic as to believe that others of
different experiences or backgrounds are incapable of
understanding the values and needs of people from a different
group. Many are so capable. ... However, to understand
takes time and effort, something that not all people are willing
to give. For others, their experiences limit their ability to
understand the experiences of others.8 '
The remainder of this Article will focus on two cases that
illustrate how sociocultural dissonance between a judge and a
contracting party may affect the outcome in a particular case.
II. CONSIDERATION AND CULTURE IN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF THE
BLOOD CONTRACT
A. Kim v. Son-Just the Facts?
Stephen Son operated a South Korean company, MJ, Inc. ("MJ")
of which he was also the majority shareholder." In addition, he was
the sole owner of a California corporation, Netouch International
Inc. ("Netouch")."' Jinsoo Kim invested 100 million won and also
loaned 30 million won to MJ.8' Additionally, Kim loaned $40,000
79. An example is criminal law, in which courts will consider a claimant's
subjective belief that he was in danger when analyzing a claim of self-defense,
and in which many states recognize diminished capacity, insanity, and battered
women's syndrome as mitigating circumstances or defenses. See JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 221-22, 313-44 (3d ed. 1995).
80. See, e.g., Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in
Realism, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 5-6 (1998).
81. Id. at 7.
82. Sotomayor, supra note 68, at 92.
83. Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9,
2009).
84. Id.
85. Id. (noting also that the won is the unit of currency in South Korea).
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(U.S.) to Netouch.86 These businesses failed.
In October of 2004, Son and Kim met in a sushi bar where, the
court notes, they "consumed a great deal of alcohol."' Son obtained
a safety pin from a waiter, used it to prick his finger, and wrote a
note in his own blood which, translated from Korean, stated: "Sir,
please forgive me. Because of my deeds you have suffered
financially. I will repay you to the best of my ability."89 At some
time that day, he also wrote, in ink, "I hereby swear [promise] that I
will pay back, to the best of my ability, the estimated amount of
170,000,000 [w]ons to [Kim] .,, He gave both notes to Kim.91
In June 2006, Kim sued Son claiming, among other things, that
Son had agreed to pay Kim 170 million won, or the equivalent of
$170,000.92 The trial court ruled in Son's favor, finding that the
"blood agreement lacked sufficient consideration because it 'was not
a result of a bargained-for-exchange, but rather a gratuitous
promise by [Son] who took personally that [Kim], his good friend,
had a failure in his investments that [Son] had initially brought him
into.'"" The California state appellate court agreed, finding that
Kim's alleged forbearance to sue was not good consideration because
his claims against Son were "wholly invalid."94 The court noted that
"it was undisputed the corporations (MJ and Netouch) were valid
separate corporate entities and those businesses received Kim's
loans and investment money."95 Because the trial court found that
Son did not personally guarantee the loans to the corporations, the
appellate court concluded that he was not legally liable for any
claims that Kim may have had against the corporations.9 6 The
appellate court concluded that "Kim's forbearance in filing a
meritless lawsuit cannot supply adequate consideration for Son's
gratuitous promise."
B. Consideration in Context
The appellate court in Kim v. Son analyzed the facts of the case
without regard to the cultural background and understanding of the
parties. An obvious observation in the court's defense is that the
cause of action was brought in a California courtroom, so the court's
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (alteration in original).
91. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, Kim v. Son, 2009 WL 597232 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009) (No. G039818).
92. Son, 2009 WL 597232, at *1.
93. Id. (alteration in original) (citing to trial court decision).
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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application of U.S. norms in interpreting the facts is neither
surprising nor controversial. Furthermore, cultural factors were not
raised in the parties' appellate briefs.9" Yet, in order to understand
the actions and intent of the parties fully and properly, one must
view them in proper context.99
In this case, the appellant-promisee was a Korean
businessman.xoo He loaned money to, and invested in, two
companies controlled by the appellee-promisor.'0o These two
companies operated children's clothing boutiques in Korea. 102 One of
the companies, MJ, was a South Korean company.'o The name
"MJ" derived from the appellee-promisor's legal name, Myung Joo. o4
The promissory note was written in Korean characters. o0 The two
men had known each other since the early 1990s.1o' The rest of this
Subpart discusses how attention to the parties' relationship and
Korean cultural background may enable a better understanding of
the parties' actions and the facts of the case, which may, in turn,
enable a better application of relevant doctrine.
1. Kim v. Son: The Facts in Cultural Context
Lon Fuller writes that legal formalities should be reserved for
relatively important transactions. He notes that inherent in some
situations are the safeguards that the doctrine of consideration aims
to provide:
The need for investing a particular transaction with some legal
formality will depend upon the extent to which the guaranties
that the formality would afford are rendered superfluous by
forces native to the situation out of which the transaction
arises-including in these "forces" the habits and conceptions
of the transacting parties.
98. See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 91; Respondent's Brief, Kim
v. Son, 2009 WL 597232 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (No. G039818). The author did not
have access to the briefs that were filed with the trial court to determine
whether any cultural factors were raised at the trial court level.
99. See Lilian Miles, The Cultural Aspects of Corporate Governance Reform
in South Korea, 2007 J. Bus. L. 851, 858 ("Cultural differences have the
potential to create conflict and may affect the extent to which Anglo-American
practices are successfully implemented in Korean companies. The fundamental
issue is simply this-individuals from different cultures perceive, understand
and judge situations differently. Cultural disparity leads to differing mindsets,
the prioritising of different principles and the pursuit of different values.").
100. Respondent's Brief, supra note 98, at 4.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 91, at 4.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 5.
106. Id. at 4.
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Whether there is any need, for example, to set up a
formality designed to induce deliberation will depend upon the
degree to which the factual situation, innocent of any legal
remolding, tends to bring about the desired circumspective
frame of mind. 0 7
The ritual of drawing blood with a pin might seem to be one
that would make anybody deliberate before acting further. Yet, the
circumstances of this particular transaction-at first blush-appear
not to be particularly conducive to circumspection. Both men had
consumed a large amount of alcohol. They were in a sushi bar
rather than in a conference room or an office. Without taking into
account the cultural background of the parties, the decision maker
might make assumptions about what happened. For example, it
might appear that the promisee took advantage of the promisor by
getting him drunk and then pressuring him to draft the promissory
note. Given the environment, the form of the contract reinforces
such fears. The safety pin is retrieved from a waiter, indicating that
there was no forethought to drafting such a note, and the note is
written in blood, a rather dramatic and emotional gesture. The
judge is inclined to analogize the situation to one within his or her
own cultural frame of reference-that of someone waking up with a
bad hangover and a mysterious tattoo.
To a westerner, the setting in which Son signed the promissory
note appears to be one in which parties might act rashly and
inconsiderately, as business in the United States is usually not
conducted in sushi bars after heavy drinking. Yet Korean
businessmen typically conduct business under exactly those
circumstances.' Business relationships in Korea are based upon
personal relationships, and heavy drinking is an integral part of
developing those relationships.'o9 The U.S. Commercial Service, the
trade promotion agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce,
advises that, in Korea, "[t]he heavy drinking of the Korean alcohol,
Soju, beer, scotch, or other liquor is commonplace in establishing a
personal, business relationship.""0 After-hours drinking is viewed
as an important part of doing business in Korea."' For Koreans,
drinking is an important part of social and work life and an
107. Fuller, supra note 19, at 805.
108. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Commercial Serv., Doing Business in
Korea, http://www.buyusa.gov/korea/en/doingbusinessinkorea.html (last visited
Sept. 7, 2010).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Clayton DeGeorgio, Dos and Dont's of Global Biz Etiquette, THE
SEOuL TIMEs, available at http://theseoultimes.com/ST/?url=/ST/db/read.php
?idx=1432 (last visited Sept. 7, 2010) ("Many South Koreans talk business while
drinking, considering that drinking is an extension of their work."); Tom Kuntz,
Word for Word/Drinking Etiquette Abroad: How to Succeed in Business By
Getting Really Bombed, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1997, at WK7.
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important way to develop relationships." 2 When viewed in cultural
context, the circumstances under which the blood contract was made
are not unusual and do not raise the same suspicions that they
would without an understanding of the business and social norms
guiding the parties' conduct.
The idea of a contract itself is different in Korean culture.
"Friendly negotiations" or agreements to confer in "good faith" are
much more common than written contracts."' The appellant may
have given the loans to the appellee with the understanding that
specific negotiations regarding repayment would occur at a later
date. Philip McConnaughay writes:
[Blecause the very notion of assigning firm consequences to
conduct or events long before the conduct or events occur (if
they occur at all) is counterintuitive to traditional Asian
commercial practices, written contract terms professing such
an exercise commonly are viewed as not carrying
determinative weight. Instead, there frequently is a strong
expectation that relational and circumstantial considerations
will prevail over (or at the very least, qualify and inform)
specific written contract terms in determining the response of
commercial parties to various events and contingencies as
their relationship unfolds. Mutual adjustment and
accommodation is expected. "
Even a written agreement does not conclude a transaction but is
viewed as the "beginning of negotiations with a Korean partner, not
the end of discussions""5 and the parties should be "prepared to
modify the meanings of the terms afterwards, as conditions
change., 1 6 Given the importance of personal relationships and trust
112. See Dong Wook Lee et al., Korean Working Adults' and Undergraduates'
Attitudes Towards, and Self-Efficacy in, Joining Drinking Parties, 34 Soc.
BEHAv. & PERSONALITY 487, 488 (2006).
113. Philip J. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in
East-West Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 427, 445-49 (2001).
114. Id. at 447-48.
115. Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the
Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 105, 156 (2004) (quoting U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDES (KOREA) 6 (1998)),
http://www.state.gov/www/about-state/business/com-guides/1999/eastasia
/korea99_four.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2010)); see also Miles, supra note 99, at
861 ("Unlike business relationships in the west, businesses in Korea do not
typically rely on contract or legal rules to conclude a business deal."); Yong-Jin
Song et al., Success and Failure of Business Negotiations for South Koreans, J.
INT'L & AREA STUDIES, Dec. 2004, at 45, 59 (noting one expert's comment that
"Americans think that a contract is a law and a final product. Koreans,
however, think that a contract is a beginning. After signing a contract, Koreans
think that they are now ready to do something. They think, 'We can flexibly
apply later. We can handle problems case by case in our mutual trust as
problems come up.'").
116. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 115, at 157 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF
656 [Vol. 45
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
in Korean business transactions, Kim may have assumed that Son
would act in good faith to address the issue of repayment in the
event that the business did not perform as the parties expected. The
subsequent "blood contract" could be viewed as a way for Son to
show his good faith by promising to repay the original loan amounts.
The drawing of blood then may be understood as a way to show
sincerity rather than as evidence of extreme intoxication, mental
instability, or coercion.
The order of events in the case-with money given before the
specifics of repayment were addressed-appears backwards
compared to the way business is typically conducted in the United
States, with the written promise of repayment preceding the
disbursement of money."' The terms of the loan were neither
definite nor put in writing. Yet the nature of the transaction is
erratic only when compared to a typical loan or investment in the
United States. Trust and sincerity have particular importance in
establishing Korean business relationships,"8 unlike in the United
States where arms-length negotiations are the norm. One group
researching South Korean business negotiations states, "Trust
building is important. If two partners set up trust, paper contracts
are not that important for Koreans."" 9 Thus, neither the form nor
the manner of the transaction would be unusual in Korea, where
neither the doctrine of consideration nor the statute of frauds exists
in contract law.120
Finally, even the determination of the existence of a bargain
itself may be affected by cultural preconceptions and biases. Both
the trial and appellate court in Kim v. Son concluded that Son's
promise was not bargained for because he did not receive anything
in exchange for his promise.12 Son had already received, and
presumably spent, the money from Kim.122 The courts recognized
that which has measurable, monetary value, reflecting western
law's separation between the public and private spheres.'2  Such a
STATE, supra note 115, at 7).
117. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 115, at 7 (noting that the primary
objective in Korean contract negotiations is "reaching a common
understanding .. .of each party's responsibilities," with the subsequent
objective of putting that understanding in contract form).
118. See Song et al., supra note 115, at 56 (finding that "South Koreans seem
to believe that sincerity could move the mind of their counterpart" in business
negotiations).
119. Id.
120. Oh Seung Jin, Overview of Legal Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region:
South Korea (Apr. 2004), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1006&content=lps_1sapr.
121. Kim v. Son, No. 0039818, 2009 WL 597232, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9,
2009).
122. Id. at *1.
123. Feminist theory often criticizes the public/private distinction evident in
western legal liberalism, as further discussed infra Part III.A.
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view, however, fails to recognize that the parties may attach
significant value to nonmonetary gain.'2 4  Some studies have
indicated that while western businesspeople prioritize profit and
business growth, Asian businesspeople, influenced by Confucian
philosophy, regard reputation and "saving face" as more
important.125 While generalizations about cultural differences run
the risk of being overbroad or simplistic,126 such generalizations may
prompt one to recognize and reconsider one's own cultural
assumptions that are inaccurate or inappropriate in a given context.
Korea has been referred to as a "shaming culture,"27 one where
shame is a societal trait used to render judgment and reinforce
norms. 12 In making his promise of repayment, Son was "saving
face," trying to rid himself of the guilt and shame that accompanies
a moral-if not legal-obligation. His shame was so great that it
motivated him to write his promise with his own blood. The court,
however, did not include in its calculus the social and cultural value
of saving face, effectively concluding that relief from shame fails to
constitute a legal benefit.
While the foregoing analysis explains certain disparities
between Korean business culture and U.S. business culture, one
difference is not the blood contract itself. Korean businesspeople do
not typically enter into contracts written in their own blood any
more often than do western businesspeople.'2 9 But the fact that the
contract was made in blood should not thereby invalidate it. The
gruesome method of contracting may have lent the entire
transaction a freakish, exotic quality that might have overshadowed
124. One commentator notes the differences in cultural attitudes between
Asian and western businesspeople as follows:
[RIecent research shows that businessmen from different cultures
attribute different levels of importance to the same set of business
goals. Those from Asian countries (including Korea) regard respect
for ethical norms, long-term orientation, patriotism, national pride,
honour, saving face and reputation, and showing a responsibility
toward society as more important than the pursuance of immediate
profit and growth of the business. Businesses in the west, on the
other hand, prioritise the pursuit of short-term profit. Wealth is
considered the prime measure of success and human worth.
Miles, supra note 99, at 858-59.
125. Id. at 858.
126. Ilhyung Lee, for example, notes that while Koreans traditionally prefer
nonlegal settlement over court adjudication, they are becoming "more willing to
advance legal claims, and more willing to resort to the courts." Ilhyung Lee,
Korean Perception(s) of Equality and Equal Protection, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 53, 72 (2008) (citation omitted).
127. Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute
Settlement (with Japan and the United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1,
28 (2005).
128. Id. at 27-28.
129. See MSNBC.com, Contract in Blood Still Open to Interpretation, May
30, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13050591.
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other, more relevant aspects of the case, including that the promise
was also written much more conventionally with an ink pen.1o
An expanded intent analysis provides focus and direction when
considering facts in cultural context.'3 ' One might question whether
volitional and cognitive intent were lacking given Son's state of
intoxication and the personal relationship between the parties.
Considering that business among Korean businessmen who have a
personal or social relationship is commonly conducted while
drinking, it seems less likely that Son did not know or could not
control what he was doing. The promise was made in writing twice,
in pen and in blood, further indicating that Son did in fact know
what he was doing, and could control his actions. There is no
evidence that the notes showed indicia of mental impairment, such
as illegibility or misspelled words.132  Finally, Son's promise of
repayment fulfilled his contextual purposive intent, which was to
"save face" and preserve his reputation and relationship with Kim. 33
Cultural context affects the way that we understand contract's
form and function. The contract between Son and Kim was made in
writing, both in pen and in blood, satisfying the evidentiary
function.'3  Similarly, the cautionary and channeling functions
appear to be satisfied, as jabbing oneself with a safety pin and
scribbling a promise in blood would likely induce deliberation even
while intoxicated. 3 ' The note written in ink also satisfies the
channeling and cautionary functions. 136 The blood note's words are
promissory but primarily appear to serve the function of an apology
and to manifest Son's good and sincere intentions: "Sir, please
forgive me. Because of my deeds you have suffered financially. I
will repay you to the best of my ability."'37 The note written in ink,
on the other hand, is devoid of the emotionality of the note written
in blood: "I hereby swear [promise] that I will pay back, to the best
of my ability, the estimated amount of 170,000,000 [w]ons to
[Kim]."
As an ancillary matter, while an analysis of the facts of the case
in cultural context would likely yield a different conclusion
regarding the existence of consideration, additional facts are needed
in order to determine whether Son breached the contract. Both
notes state that Son would repay Kim to the "best of [his] ability,"139
130. Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9,
2009).
131. See Kim, supra note 10, at 476-77.
132. See Son, 2009 WL 597232, at *1.
133. See Kim, supra note 10, at 481.
134. See Fuller, supra note 19, at 800.
135. See id. at 800-01.
136. See id.
137. Son, 2009 WL 597232, at *1.
138. Id. (alteration in original).
139. Id.
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and the parties do not discuss whether or not he attempted to repay
the debt or to what lengths he went to do so. In conclusion, while
the facts in sociocultural context seem to support a finding of
consideration, a court would still need to determine whether the
contract was breached.
III. THE DIFFERENCE THAT GENDER MAKES
In Part II, I examined the effect of cultural disparities in
applying the doctrine of consideration. In this Part, I analyze the
difference that gender makes4 o in a case involving in vitro
fertilization.
A. In re the Marriage of Witten-Selecting Facts, Selecting a Story
Arthur ("Trip") Witten and Tamera Witten had been married for
approximately seven-and-a-half years when Trip filed for divorce.'
During the marriage, the parties had undergone the process of in
vitro fertilization.'42 Prior to commencing the in vitro fertilization
process, the parties signed informed consent documents prepared by
the University of Nebraska Medical Center ("UNMC"), which
included an "Embryo Storage Agreement" ("the Agreement"). 143 The
Agreement provided as follows:
Release of Embryos. The Client Depositors [Trip and Tameral
understand and agree that containers of embryos stored
pursuant to this agreement will be used for transfer, release or
disposition only with the signed approval of both Client
Depositors. UNMC will release the containers of embryos only
to a licensed physician recipient of written authorization of the
Client Depositors.14
The Agreement had one exception to the requirement that both
parties sign to release the embryos, and that was "upon the death of
one or both of the client depositors.' 4 5 Another provision of the
Agreement set forth the following contingencies that would
terminate UNMC's obligation to store the embryos: "(1) the client
depositors' written authorization to release the embryos or to
destroy them; (2) the death of the client depositors; (3) the failure of
the client depositors to pay the annual storage fee; or (4) the
140. Feminist legal scholars have long challenged the notion of gender
neutrality and objectivity in the law. For an anthology of feminist legal theory,
see AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991).
141. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa 2003).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (alteration in original).
145. Id.
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expiration of ten years from the date of the agreement.""4
After undergoing in vitro fertilization, Tamera and Trip filed for
divorce. As part of the dissolution proceedings, Tamera requested
that she be awarded the embryos."' Trip did not want her to use
them, even though he did not want the embryos destroyed, and
asked the court to enforce the mutual consent provision in the
Agreement.' Tamera claimed that the Agreement was against
state public policy because it allowed Trip to evade "his prior
agreement to become a parent."149
In considering Tamera's argument, the judge framed the issue
as "whether there is any public policy against an agreement
allowing a donor to abandon in vitro fertilization attempts when
viable embryos remain."5 o The framing of the issue is misleading in
that Tamera was not requesting Trip's continued involvement in
any in vitro fertilization attempts; on the contrary, she did not want
him to interfere with her efforts to implant the embryos in her or in
a surrogate mother.'"' Furthermore, Tamera had testified that she
would allow Trip to exercise his parental rights or to have them
terminated. 5
The court's opinion considers the case using an equality
framework, which assumes that both parties are on equal footing. It
states: "[I]t would be against the public policy of this state to enforce
a prior agreement between the parties in this highly personal area
of reproductive choice when one of the parties has changed his or
her mind concerning the disposition or use of the embryos." 5 3
This equality approach ignores that the parties are not, in fact,
equally situated. The in vitro process requires much more physical
involvement from the woman than from the man.' The opinion
summarily describes the process as follows: "Because Tamera was
unable to conceive children naturally, they had eggs taken from
Tamera artificially fertilized with Trip's sperm. Tamera then
underwent several unsuccessful embryo transfers in an attempt to
become pregnant. At the time of trial seventeen fertilized eggs
remained in storage at (UNMC]." 15
What is most revealing is not what the opinion says, but what it
omits. Contrary to what the court's breezy summary might suggest,
in vitro fertilization is a painful process for the woman that involves
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 773.
149. Id. at 779.
150. Id. at 780.
151. Id. at 772.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 781.
154. See DONNA DICKENSON, PROPERTY IN THE BODY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
63-64 (2007).
155. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 772.
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hormonal treatment intended to stimulate the ovaries to produce
multiple follicles (as opposed to a single follicle) and the surgical and
often dangerous removal of the ova for fertilization.16  Stimulation
of the ovaries has dangerous potential side effects, including clotting
disorders, production of cysts, kidney damage, stroke, and ovarian
twisting. "" One court described in vitro fertilization as "a
complicated, expensive, and somewhat dangerous process.... The
process requires frequent visits to the doctor, especially to avoid a
condition called 'hyperstimulation,' in which the ovaries become
swollen. This condition can be life-threatening to the mother
because of possible interference with kidney and liver function."58
The Witten court's summary omits the pain involved in
undergoing the in vitro fertilization process. It ignores the
likelihood that Tamera would not have agreed to the painful
hormonal therapy and extraction process if she knew her husband
would prohibit her from implanting the embryos. It pretends that
Tamera and Trip are similarly situated when they are not. It would
be one thing if Tamera were trying to force Trip to continue his
participation by, for example, extracting additional sperm; it is quite
another to let Tamera continue with the implantation process
without any further participation-legal or physical-from her ex-
husband. Trip had already contributed his sperm so Tamera's use of
the embryos would not force any further physical participation from
Trip. Tamera testified that Trip's legal and financial participation
could also terminate, if he so wished.'59 Trip was not opposed to the
use of the embryos in principle. 60 He testified that he "would not
oppose donating the embryos for use by another couple"-he just
"did not want Tamera to use them."161
The opinion also ignores the expense and the improbability of
Tamera being able to repeat the in vitro process. Trip's brief claims
that Tamera is "still producing eggs and will for an estimated eight
to ten additional years [and that].... [tihe same procedure used by
Tamera and [Trip] to attempt to have children can be used by
Tamera in the future."'62 But as Tamera's brief states, she was over
thirty-five years old and, due to a tumor and scarring in her
Fallopian tubes, could probably not naturally conceive.' 63
156. See ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRo FERTILIZATION: BUILDING POLICY
FROM LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 147-48 (1989); DICKENSON, supra note
154, at 63-64.
157. DICKENSON, supra note 154, at 64.
158. LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (W.D. Mich.
2001).
159. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 772.
160. Id. at 773.
161. Id.
162. Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 3, In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (No.
03-0551), 2003 WL 24314607.
163. Respondent-Appellant's/Cross-Appellee's Brief at 8, In re Witten, 672
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Furthermore, the process is expensive and costs thousands of
dollars." Tamera earned an average income of around $3000 a
year.' 5  Her low income was due in large part to long periods of
unemployment necessitated by her attempts to get pregnant. 166 The
court neglects to mention the infeasibility of Tamera undergoing the
process again due to these factors.
The omission of the court might seem particularly striking since
the presiding judge was Judge Marsha Ternus, who has since
become the first female Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court.167
But it would be misguided to suggest that gender similarities
override socioeconomic or other sociocultural disparities and naive
to think that all women share the same perspective, beliefs, and
experiences. 8 A woman who has risen to the pinnacle in a male-
dominated environment,'69 makes a comfortable salary, and enjoys
an elevated social status' 0 might not necessarily identify with
someone in Tamera Witten's position simply because they are both
women. It would also be inaccurate to suggest that women are
impervious to the male bias prevalent in society.' 7 ' My critique in
N.W.2d 768 (No. 03-0551), 2003 WL 24314606.
164. See LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (W.D.
Mich. 2001) (noting that the cost of the process "often exceeds $10,000").
165. Respondent-Appellant's/Cross-Appellee's Reply Brief at 2, In re Witten,
672 N.W.2d 768 (No. 03-0551), 2003 WL 24314608.
166. See id.
167. See Jeff Eckhoff, Woman To Lead Highest Court in Iowa, DES MOINES
REG., Sept. 6, 2006, at Al.
168. See Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern
Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1046 (1992)
(analyzing the gendered nature of legal discourse by comparing three texts on
the impossibility doctrine and acknowledging that the "stereotypes [Frug]
associated with gender may not be every woman's or every feminists").
169. Prior to being appointed the first female Chief Justice, Ternus was only
the second woman to serve on Iowa's Supreme Court. Eckhoff, supra note 167,
at A8.
170. Even including her ex-husband's salary, Tamera Witten would have not
been close to being in the same income bracket as Judge Ternus. In 1999, Trip
had an income of $37,850 and Tamera had an income of $3087. Respondent-
Appellant's/Cross-Appellee's Reply Brief, supra note 165, at 2. In 2000, Trip's
income was $41,010, and Tamera's income was $3069. Id. In 2001, Trip had an
income of $40,474, and Tamera had no income. Id. In 2002, Trip had an
income of $44,584.33, and Tamera had an income of $15,623.27. Id. While
Judge Ternus's salary for the same period was not readily available, it is known
that Iowa judges "collect above-average salaries" compared to judges in other
states. Grant Schulte, Judges' Pay Tops U.S. Average, DES MOINES REG., Dec.
25, 2009, at lB. An Iowa Supreme Court justice in 2007 earned approximately
$146,890. Id. at B2. Judge Ternus's husband, Dennis Drake, is "the general
counsel of Iowa Health System, the state's largest chain of hospitals and
clinics." Drake's Bid To Dismiss Charge Is Rejected, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 15,
2009, at 2A. He has been employed by the company since 1986. See Iowa
Health System, Executive Team, http://www.ihs.org/body.cfm?id=46 (last
visited Sept. 7, 2010).
171. For example, an interesting study revealed that female artistic
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this Subpart is aimed not at the gender of the decision maker but at
the gendered nature and bias inherent in the decision. Judge
Ternus's gender does not forgive the gendered nature of her
discourse.
In order to create the seventeen embryos that were in storage, 17 2
Tamera underwent two egg retrieval surgeries and seven
transfers. 73 Several attempts were made following fertilization to
implant the embryos, and all but one were unsuccessful.'74 The sole
implanted embryo attached outside the uterus and ultimately
resulted in a loss.' 75  The opinion concludes that the
"contemporaneous mutual consent" model pursuant to which "no
transfer, release, disposition, or use of the embryos can occur
without the signed authorization of both donors," should be adopted
in this case.'76 It further rules that these seventeen embryos will be
stored indefinitely "unless both parties can agree to destroy the
fertilized eggs. Thus, any expense associated with maintaining the
status quo should logically be borne by the person opposing
destruction." 1
The contemporaneous mutual consent model ignores the
difference in nature of the contributions of a man and a woman in
the in vitro fertilization process. The woman will always suffer
more physical pain and risk more to her health than the man. To
assume equality in this context ignores the disparate nature of their
participation in the in vitro process. The court reasons that "it
would be against the public policy of this state to enforce a prior
agreement between the parties in this highly personal area of
reproductive choice when one of the parties has changed his or her
mind concerning the disposition or use of the embryos."'7 Thus, the
court recognizes Trip's ability to change his mind-something that is
directors were more likely than male artistic directors to assign lower ratings to
purportedly female-written scripts. Emily Glassberg Sands, Opening the
Curtain on Playwright Gender: An Integrated Economic Analysis of
Discrimination in American Theater 104 (Apr. 15, 2009) (unpublished B.A.
thesis, Princeton University) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University),
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/theater
/Openingthecurtain.pdf The female artistic directors did not report believing
that female-written scripts were of lower quality, but that such works would
have "poorer economic prospects" and would face "customer" and "worker
discrimination." Id. at 77. The author of the study stated that "perhaps as a
result of the perceived customer and worker discrimination" against female-
written scripts, female artistic directors "deem a script bearing a female pen-
name to fit less well with their theaters." Id. at 77-78.
172. Respondent-Appellant's/Cross-Appellee's Brief, supra note 163, at 5.
173. Id. at 4.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 781.
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generally not recognizable in other contracts '79-as worthy of
protection and prioritizes that over the expectation and reliance
interest of Tamera, thus utterly disregarding her physical suffering.
The scholar John Robertson captures the unfairness and
irrationality of this view when he writes:
Without reliance on the husband's promise to allow the wife to
implant the embryos at Time B, she never would have
undertaken [in vitro fertilization]. Her claim would be that
the court's preference for his Time B freedom over hers, and
over the freedom of both of them at Time A to determine what
happens in the future, is not a sufficiently compelling ground
to justify that infringement, and thus would violate her
reproductive liberty. Given her reliance on his promise at
Time A to undergo bodily intrusions and her loss of
reproductive freedom at Time B if enforcement does not occur,
maximizing his freedom at Time B over her freedom at Time B
is not such a strong personal or societal interest that it
justifies overriding her right to reproduce with the embryos
created in reliance on his Time A promise.1 8 0
Judge Ternus, writing for the Witten court, expresses a "general
reluctance to become involved in intimate questions inherent in
personal relationships."'8 ' Yet, the court does just that when it
holds that "agreements entered into at the time in vitro fertilization
is commenced are enforceable and binding on the parties, 'subject to
the right of either party to change his or her mind about disposition
up to the point of use or destruction of any stored embryo."'1 82 Thus,
the court puzzlingly recognizes the legitimacy of agreements that
have to do with the very personal process of in vitro fertilization but
only until the woman has undergone the painful procedure-in
which case, "either party" can change "his or her" mind.8 ' The
gender neutral language belies that only one of the parties-the
woman-will have endangered her health in vain. Furthermore, the
court privileges the capriciousness of the male party over the
expectation and detrimental reliance of the female party.
Judge Ternus's silence speaks volumes. First, she frames the
relevant issue as one involving Trip's right to change his mind,
179. See DIMA'rEo, supra note 4, at 69.
180. John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen
Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989, 1029-30 (2001); see also Robyn L. Ikehara, Note,
Is Adoption the "New" Solution for Couples in Dispute Over Their Frozen
Embryos?, 15 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 301, 316-17 (2006) (noting that
under a "sweat equity theory," because in vitro fertilization imposes a greater
physical burden on the female participant, "the woman is automatically
awarded greater dispositional authority because she has relied so heavily to her
detriment").
181. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781.
182. Id. at 782 (quoting J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001)).
183. Id.
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rather than Tamera's interest in using the embryos.'8 Ternus
declines to consider the issue as one involving a contractual gap,
even though the agreement did not specifically address what would
happen in the event of a divorce.'85 Instead, she considers "the
present predicament" as one falling "within the general provision
governing 'release of embryos,' in which the parties agreed that the
embryos would not be transferred, released, or discarded without
'the signed approval' of both parties."' Ternus also refuses to
protect or recognize Tamera's expectation and reliance interests and
fails to mention Tamera's physical suffering and the endangerment
to her health in undergoing the in vitro process, claiming that the
"highly personal area of reproductive choice" is emotionally charged
and susceptible to change.' 87 Yet, Ternus quickly clarifies that the
court's decision "should not be construed ... to mean that
disposition agreements between donors and fertility clinics have no
validity at all."'"' On the contrary, Ternus finds that "the medical
facility and the donors should be able to rely on the terms of the
parties' contract"'89 even though that contract has to do with the
same "highly personal" subject of reproductive choice, and is
similarly "emotionally charged and susceptible to change."
B. Intent, Emotions, and Acts of Reliance
An expanded intent analysis requires a court to consider the
facts in context in order to determine whether to enforce a
contract.9 o In this case, was there an implied contract between
Tamera and Trip whereby each promised the other to do their part
to have biological children? Both Tamera and Trip had volitional
intent as both seemed to be willing and desirous of entering into the
agreement. '' There was no evidence of coercion and both parties
appeared to be legally competent. Both parties also appeared to
have cognitive intent as they understood what the process of
becoming biological parents would require of each of them.'9 2
Tamera also appeared to have the contextual purposive intent to
become a parent, regardless of what later happened between her
184. Id. at 773-74 ("The only question, then, is whether such agreements
are enforceable when one of the parties later changes his or her mind with
respect to the proper disposition of the embryos.").
185. Id. at 773 ("[Tlhe agreement had a specific provision governing control
of the embryos if one or both parties died, but did not explicitly deal with the
possibility of divorce.").
186. Id.
187. Id. at 781.
188. Id. at 782.
189. Id.
190. See Kim, supra note 10, at 513.
191. See id. at 480.
192. See id. at 480-81.
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and Trip.'9 s Trip, on the other hand, seemed to lack the contextual
purposive intent to become a parent. 94  He entered into the
agreement with Tamera with the understanding that they would
remain in a loving, marital relationship. He apparently had not
considered what would happen if that relationship ended. If he had
considered that possibility, he would have declined to enter into the
agreement with Tamera or at least conditioned his consent on the
continuation of their relationship. " Because Trip lacked contextual
purposive intent, the agreement between Tamera and Trip should
not be enforced unless there is a strong public policy compelling
enforcement. 196
In this case, refusing to enforce this agreement would not
undermine the security of transactions nor would it contravene any
established interest of the state, as claimed by the Witten court.
Therefore, under an expanded intent analysis, there is no
enforceable contract."' This result makes sense when one considers
the consequences of recognizing a legally enforceable contract in this
case. In order to protect Tamera's expectation interest, Trip might
be compelled to continue participating in the process of becoming a
parent, perhaps by contributing additional sperm to create more
embryos.
Yet, the undesirability of recognizing as a legal agreement the
implied promises between Trip and Tamera does not lead to the
inevitable conclusion that Trip's promise should not be enforced at
all. Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a promise may be
enforceable if it causes reasonable, detrimental reliance. 99 In this
case, Trip made either an express or implied promise to Tamera that
he would participate in the in vitro process with the goal of
becoming a parent. Tamera acted in reliance upon this promise
when she underwent the physically demanding procedure. The
ultimate question then is whether injustice could be avoided only by
enforcement of Trip's promise.200 The answer, when considering the
facts that were omitted in the court's opinion, such as Tamera's
financial situation, her age, and her infertility, is yes. To conclude
that Trip's promise should be enforceable to the extent of the reliance
would permit Tamera to use the embryos but would not require Trip
193. See id. at 481.
194. See id.
195. See In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 773.
196. See Kim, supra note 10, at 515-16.
197. See In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 780.
198. See Kim, supra note 10, at 515-16.
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) ("A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.").
200. See id.
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to participate further-financially or physically-as he might be
ordered to do if Tamera's expectation (and not reliance) interest
were to be protected.
CONCLUSION
Commentators often say that a court's objective in adjudicating
contract disputes is the enforcement of reasonable expectations. In
order to enforce those expectations, however, a court must
determine what those reasonable expectations are. An expanded
intent analysis helps the decision maker view the contracting
situation from the standpoint of the parties, not from his or her
vantage point. The objective theory of contract, on the other hand,
assumes that the standard of reasonableness is neutral, meaning
that a determination of reasonableness is unaffected by race, class,
economic status, culture, gender, or other social factors. The
objective theory unrealistically assumes a truth that is determinate
and immutable. In order to remain true to its philosophical
objectives, contract law must recognize that reasonableness is not a
one-size-fits-all concept, but one best analyzed in sociocultural
context.
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